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by
ANABELLE MARIA D’SOUZA
(Under the Direction of Robert Brussack)
ABSTRACT
The Purpose of my thesis is to bring about the awareness of the importance of
Privacy in our lives. Privacy is an essential element of a free society without which
individuals would lose the ability to interact with one another in private. With the
advancement in police surveillance technology there is a clash between an individuals
right to keep a secret and the State’s power to penetrate that secret. State of the art
technologies such as the financial crimes enforcement network, wearable computing and
surveillance cameras are some of the latest devices invading privacy. These technological
advances have become so deep rooted that some of the privacy invasion predicted for the
future are alarming. In order to curb privacy invasions we require stricter laws regulating
the government’s power to interfere with our privacy rights. The shape of our future
depends on how we deal with the present issues.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Privacy is a fundamental human right, which is recognized under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
and many other international and regional treaties. 1 It embodies the values of human
dignity, freedom of association and freedom of speech and has become one of the most
important human rights issues of modern time. 2
Privacy comes from the Latin word “to separate or deprive” referring to the
distinction between what belongs to the individual rather than the State. 3 Over the years
there have been various definitions of the term “privacy”. 4 The array of definitions may
be due to the variety of personal matters covered by them. 5 One scholar recognized
privacy as a mechanism in three different ways, ‘privacy-as-seclusion,’ ‘privacy-asinformation-control’ and ‘privacy of autonomous personal life.’6 The term “privacy” can
be described as a form of power, which is a powerful tool in the hands of each individual
to protect himself against the world. 7 We could ask ourselves the question - who is
entitled to this power of privacy? I think every person in the world is entitled to the right
1

David Banisar and Simon Davies, Global Trends in Privacy Protection: An International Survey of Data
Protection, and Surveillance Laws and Developments, 18 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 1,1 (1999).
2
Id.
3
Kent Walker, Where Everybody Knows Your Name: A Pragmatic Look At The Costs Of Privacy And The
Benefits Of Information Exchange, 2000 Stan. Tech. L. Rev.2, 3 (2000).
4
Carol M. Bast, What’s bugging you? Inconsistencies And Irrationalities Of The law Of Eavesdropping, 47
DePaul L. Rev. 837, 881 (1998).
5
Id.
6
William C. Hefferman, Privacy Rights, 29 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 737, 746 (1995). Tort law is usually
associated with protection for the first two mechanisms of privacy, while constitutional law is associated
with protection for privacy of autonomous personal life.

1

of privacy, be it a person living on the streets or a millionaire living in a mansion. When
an individual loses his privacy, he also loses the capacity to distinguish himself from the
rest of the world; he will not be able to distinguish himself from others, to maintain an
independent life and be a complete and autonomous person. 8 According to Ruth Gavison,
privacy comprises of three elements: secrecy, anonymity and solitude. 9 An individual
loses his/her privacy “as others obtain information about the individual [loss of secrecy],
pay attention to him [loss of anonymity], or gain access to him [loss of solitude].”10
According to Roger Clark, “Privacy is the interest that individuals have in sustaining a
'personal space', free from interference by other people and organizations.”11
Drilling down into a deeper level, privacy has several dimensions:
1. Privacy of the person - this is sometimes referred to as “bodily privacy”. It is
concerned with the integrity of the individual's body. Issues include compulsory
immunization, blood transfusion without consent, compulsory provision of samples of
body fluids and body tissue and compulsory sterilization;
2. Privacy of personal behavior - This relates to all aspects of behavior, but especially to
sensitive matters, such as sexual preferences and habits, political activities and religious
practices, both in private and in public places. It includes what is sometimes referred to as
“media privacy”;
3. Privacy of personal communications - Individuals claim an interest in being able to
communicate among them, using various media, without routine monitoring of their
7

Michael Froomkin, The Metaphor is the Key, Cryptography, The Clipper Chip, And the Constitution, 143
U. pa. L. Rev. 709, 712 (1995).
8
Id.
9
Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 Yale L.J. 421, 433 (1980).
10
Id at 428.
11
Roger Clark, Introduction to Dataveillance and Information Privacy, and Definitions of Terms, available
at http://www.anu.edu.au/people/Roger.Clarke/DV/Intro.html.

2

communications by other persons or organizations. This includes what is sometimes
referred to as “interception privacy” and;
4. Privacy of personal data - Individuals claim that data about themselves should not be
automatically available to other individuals and organizations, and that, even where data
is possessed by another party, the individual must be able to exercise a substantial degree
of control over that data and its use. This is sometimes referred to as “data privacy” and
“information privacy”. 12
Privacy is very important today. Ruth Gavison viewed privacy as a concept
pertaining to the individual. 13 Privacy embodies the values of a healthy, liberal,
democratic, and pluralistic society; individual autonomy; mental health; creativity; and
the capacity to form and maintain meaningful relations with others. 14 It provides an
individual with the room to grow, a safety valve and respect. 15 An individual can grow in
a way that he or she has the ability to develop new ideas, contemplate past experiences
and mature. 16 The loss of privacy may be voluntary or involuntary. 17 The loss is
voluntary when the individual freely gives up information, anonymity, or solitude. 18 The
loss is involuntary when privacy is invaded without the individual’s consent. 19 Here the
privacy loss is not the responsibility of the individual. 20

12

Id.
See supra note 4 at 885.
14
Id.
15
Id at 886.
16
Id.
17
Id at 888.
18
Id at 889.
19
Id.
20
Id. The case of Commonwealth v. Louden illustrates the voluntary loss of privacy occasioned by an
individual speaking loudly so that a third party could overhear the conversation without any electronic
interception device. In this case the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that “once the conversation, threats
and arguments between the Loudens and the screams of the children became audible to the neighbors,
13

3

Historically in the United States, the formal recognition of privacy was given in Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis’s article ‘The Right to Privacy’, 21 in which the authors
defined privacy as ‘The right to be let alone.’ 22 Warren and Brandeis’s article on privacy
was considered the “most influential law review article of all.”23 Although the law did
provide some protection for privacy before Warren and Brandeis wrote their famous
article, the protection consisted of limited legal theories whose shortcomings outweighed
their usefulness. 24 Rather than protecting individuals through legal doctrine specifically
designed to safeguard their privacy interests, nineteenth century American courts and
legislatures provided remedies for only a limited number of intrusions and left individuals
with incomplete and inadequate protection. 25 The Fourth Amendment of the American
Constitution provided for this remedy. 26 The government honored the notion that “a
man’s house is his castle” and in 1791 added the Fourth Amendment to preserve "The
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."27 But the Fourth
Amendment had its limitations; it only prevented government officials from unlawfully
intruding into the home or personal property, leaving private citizens free to invade the

through a dividing wall in their home, the Loudens lost whatever expectation of privacy of privacy they had
that their secret discussions and conversations would not be overheard.” 638 A. 2d 953, 959 (Pa 1994).
21
4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890).
22
Id at 195.
23
Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth Of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and Brandeis, 39 Cath. U. L. Rev.
703, 703 (1990).
24
Id at 705.
25
Id.
26
Id.
27
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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privacy of life at will. 28 In order to remedy those invasions committed by private citizens,
the best relief that the courts in the nineteenth century could offer was an action for
trespass. 29 But in order to invoke this remedy, the plaintiff had to prove a physical
intrusion upon their real property and this severely limited the remedy’s usefulness. 30
In order to rectify the lack of effective legal remedies, the courts occasionally
tried to compensate plaintiffs by taking existing legal doctrine to extremes as seen in the
case of Moore v. New York Elevated R.R. Co. 31 In this case the plaintiff who was a lifetenant of a house brought an action to recover damages alleged to have been suffered by
her when the defendant railroad company erected a railroad that overlooked her house. 32
The defendants were held responsible for the loss of privacy suffered by the plaintiff, and
the jury found that the passengers and employees interfered with the privacy of the rooms
of the plaintiff’s house by looking in when standing on the station platform or when
coming down the stairs along the building. 33 But the court proceeded on a trespass theory
of recovery, and it did not address the damages for the emotional distress occasioned by
the loss of privacy. Thus the plaintiff was not fully compensated for privacy invasion. 34
The lack of legal redress and the increase in the number of privacy invasions over
the years led to demands for improved remedies. 35 During the nineteenth century there
was a common occurrence of journalistic invasions of the privacy of public figures. 36 In

28

Kramer, supra note 23 at 705.
Id.
30
Id.
31
130 N.Y. 523, 29 N.E. 997 (1892).
32
Id at 526.
33
Id at 528.
34
Kramer, supra note 23 at 707.
35
Id at 708.
36
Christopher S. Milligan, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. Cal.
Interdisciplinary L.J. 295, 312 (1999). With the advent of quick photography and mass-circulation
newspapers, the latter part of the century saw the first invasion of privacy lawsuits in the United States.
29

5

the present day, battles over privacy reflect historical conflicts. 37 There is always tension
between the individual need for privacy and autonomy, and the sense that society suffers
when morality goes unregulated. 38
Over the years the Supreme Court has developed a limited right to privacy in a
string of cases: Griswold v. Connecticut, 39 Roe v. Wade, 40 Whalen v. Roe 41 and Bowers
v. Hardwick. 42

37

Id at 313.
Id.
39
381U.S. 479 (1965). In this case the Appellant was a licensed physician and a professor at the Yale
Medical School. He gave information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons as to the means
of preventing conception. The wife was examined and prescribed the best contraceptive device or material
for her use. Sections 53—32 of the general statutes of Connecticut law provide that: 'Any person who uses
any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not less
than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days nor more than one year or be both fined and
imprisoned.’ The Supreme Court held that the Connecticut law forbidding use of contraceptives
unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital privacy.
40
410 U.S. 113 (1973). In this case, a pregnant single woman (Roe) brought a class action challenging the
constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion laws, which proscribe procuring or attempting an abortion
except on medical advice for the purpose of saving the mother's life. The District Courts judgement was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Texas and held that the abortion statutes were void as vague and over
broadly infringing the plaintiffs' Ninth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
41
429 U.S. 589 (1977). Physicians and patients brought an action challenging the constitutionality of New
York statutes which required that the state be provided with a copy of every prescription for certain drugs
and which also provided security measures for that information in the state's possession. The Supreme
Court held that the statutes were a reasonable exercise of the state's broad police power; that finding that
the state had not shown necessity for the requirement was insufficient basis for holding the statutes
unconstitutional.
42
478 U.S. 186 (1986). A Practicing homosexual brought action challenging constitutionality of Georgia
sodomy statute. The Supreme Court held that Georgia's sodomy statute did not violate the fundamental
rights of homosexuals.
38
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CHAPTER 2
REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
A. An Analysis of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment 43 is an expression of an “eloquent, unequivocal principle
of a democratic government.”44 The framers of the constitution intended the Fourth
Amendment to protect the citizens against indiscriminate and arbitrary general authority,
which had been asserted by the British against the American colonies. 45 The purpose of
the Fourth Amendment was to protect the citizens against unwarranted intrusions, but
was not intended as a general restraint against all police practices. 46 The modern
development of the Fourth Amendment can be best summarized in the article “The Right
to Privacy”, in which Warren and Brandies clearly stated that “[T]he individual shall
have full protection in person and in property is a principle as old as the common law; but
it has been found necessary from time to time to define anew the exact nature and extent
of such protection.”47 The concept of "reasonable expectations of privacy"48 is at the
forefront of all Fourth Amendment analysis. 49 It is the starting point for any defendant

43

supra note 27.
Gerald K. Freund, Look Up In The Sky, It’s a Bird, It’d a Plane...It’s Reasonableness, 20 Sw. U.L.
Rev.195, 198 (1991).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
supra note 21 at 193.
48
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “reasonable” as: Fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the
circumstances. Fit and appropriate to the end in view. Having the faculty of reason; rational; governed by
reason; under the influence of reason; agreeable to reason. Thinking, speaking, or acting according to the
dictates of reason. Not immoderate or excessive, being synonymous with rational, honest, equitable, fair,
suitable, moderate, tolerable. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1138 ( 5th ed. 1979).
49
Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, And The Concept Of The
Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. Mem. L. Rev. 907, 908 (1997).
44
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seeking to suppress evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 50 If a
defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in an area searched or an
item seized, he does not suffer a Fourth Amendment violation. 51 “The Fourth
Amendment reflects the framers of the Constitution’s determination that individuals in a
democratic society be able to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from government
intrusions.”52 The case of Boyd v. United States53 which was decided a century after the
passage of the Bill of Rights, was the first significant Supreme Court decision involving
the Fourth Amendment as well as the Fifth Amendment privilege agains t selfincrimination. 54 It recognized that the Fourth Amendment “was to apply to all invasions
on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctity of a man’s home and the
privacies of life.”55 In the absence of a search or seizure, however, the Fourth
Amendment is not implicated by police action. 56 For nearly fifty years, beginning in 1928
with Olmstead v. United States,57 the U.S. Supreme Court premised the existence of a
search on whether a physical trespass had occurred under the local property law. 58 In this
case, the petitioners were convicted in the District Court for the Western District of
Washington of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act (27 USCA) by

50

Id.
Id.
52
Melvin Gutterman, A Formulation Of The Value and Means Models Of The Fourth Amendment In The
Age Of Technologically Enhanced Surveillance, 39 Syracuse L. Rev. 647, 649 (1988).
53
116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746, 3 A.F.T.R. 2488 U.S.N.Y, (1886). In this case Justice Bradley
decided that “it does not require actual entry upon premises and search for and seizure of papers to
constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment; a compulsory
production of a party's private books and papers, to be used against himself or his property in a criminal or
penal proceeding, or for a forfeiture, is within the spirit and meaning of the amendment.”
54
Gutterman, supra Note 51 at 651.
55
Id.
56
Richard S. Julie, High-Tech surveillance Tools And The Fourth Amendment: Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy In The Technological Age, 37 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 127, 128 (2000).
57
277 U.S. 438, 48 S.Ct. 564 (1928).
58
Julie, supra note 56.
51

8

unlawfully possessing, transporting and importing intoxicating liquors. 59 The
information, which lead to the discovery of the conspiracy and its nature and extent, was
largely obtained by intercepting messages on the telephones of the conspirators by the
federal prohibition officers. 60 Small wires were inserted along the ordinary telephone
wires from the residences of four of the petitioners and those leading from the chief
office. 61 The insertions were made without trespass upon any property of the
defendants. 62 The federal officers at the wires heard the orders given for liquor by
customers and the acceptances; they became auditors of the conversations between the
partners. 63 All this disclosed the conspiracy charged in the indictment, and many of the
intercepted conversations were not merely reports, but parts of criminal acts. 64 The
Supreme Court of the United States held that the wiretapping committed by the federal
prohibition officers did not amount to a search or seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 65 The Court in the case of Olmstead, held that the only interest
protected by the Fourth Amendment were those in tangible objects, such as papers,
houses, and other physical possessions, and that those possessions were protected only
against physical invasions. 66 Overheard conversations and other types of communicative
evidence, therefore, had no specific protection, unless obtained in the violation of local
property law. 67 When does a person have a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment? The court in Olmstead read the Fourth Amendment in the literal

59

supra note 57 at 456.
Id at 456, 457.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id at 468.
66
Julie, supra note 56 at 129.
67
Id.
60

9

sense as to include “persons”, “houses”, “papers” and “effects”. 68 Even literally
construed, these material things that were afforded protection by the text of the Fourth
Amendment did not include public telephone wires or the messages they transmitted. 69
Thus there was no deterrent to prevent the government agents from using electric devices
to listen to private phone conversations. 70 But the case of Katz v. United States71 changed
all that. In this case, the agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation had placed an
“electronic listening and recording device” outside the phone booth that Charles Katz was
using to place a bet with his bookie. 72 At trial, the District Court for the Southern District
of California permitted the government, over the petitioner’s objections, to introduce
evidence of the petitioner’s end of the conversations and Charles was convicted. 73 The
Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and rejected the contention that the recordings
were obtained in violation of the Forth Amendment because “[ T]here was no physical
entrance into the area occupied by the petitioner.”74
According to Charles the Fourth Amendment provided a substantive right that his
conversation with his bookie over the pay phone, inside the glass booth, would remain

68

Jones, supra note 49 at 912.
Id.
70
Id.
71
389 U.S. 347 (1967).
72
Id at 349.
73
Id at 348.
74
Id. 18 U.S.C. s 1084. The Statute provides in pertinent part:
'(a) Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication
facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in
the placing of bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmis sion of a wire
communication which entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined no more than $10,000 or imprisoned
not more than two years, or both.’
'(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce
of information for use in news reporting of sporting events or contests, or for the transmission of
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest from a State where
betting on that sporting event or contest is legal into a State in which such betting is legal.'
69

10

private. 75 The government argued that Charles had no reasonable expectation of privacy
because the agents had not physically entered the phone booth; the phone booth was open
to all members of the public; and the glass made the activity inside the booth visible to
the public. 76 The government stressed on the fact that the telephone booth from which
Charles made his calls was constructed partly of glass, so that he was as visible after he
entered it as he would have been if he had remained outside. 77 But when Charles entered
the telephone booth to make the call, what he sought to exclude was not an intruding eye
but an uninvited ear. 78
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Charles, stating: “The Fourth
Amendment protects people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office is not subject to Fourth Amendment protection. But what
he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be
constitutionally protected.”79 The court recognized that the proscriptions of the Fourth
Amendment were no longer limited to tangible things. 80 Katz now represents the “new”
way of thinking about the Fourth Amendment and how it protects individuals. 81 It has
now allowed the court to adopt a broad construction that allows the amendment to adapt
to the changing needs of society. 82

75

supra note 71 at 349.
Id at 348-354.
77
Id at 351.
78
Id.
79
Jones, supra note 49 at 913.
80
Id at 914.
81
Id.
82
Id.
76
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B. Objective versus Subjective Expectation of Privacy
The Katz standard had revolutionized the court’s Fourth Amendment analysis. 83
After the Katz decision there have been various judicial decisions on cases where the
Courts have demarcated whether a person can anticipate a subjective or an objective
expectation of privacy. 84 In United States v. Chadwick 85 the Supreme Court recognized
that a person has an expectation of privacy in a package or a container, and the Fourth
Amendment protects this privacy interest. 86 In particular the court considered whether an
individual’s expectation of privacy in a footlocker taken from the trunk of a car violated a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 87 A subjective expectation of privacy consists of a
belief that uninvited people will not intrude in a particular area, i.e., that “one may freely
admit guests of one’s choosing…without sacrificing one’s right to expect that a space
will remain secure against all others.”88 As the court stated in United States v. Gerena,89
“[A] defendant must demonstrate that his or her professed subjective expectation of
privacy viewed from the totality of the circumstances, is at least of a quality similar in
significant respects, to the privacy expectations one would ordinarily expect an individual
to have with regard to his or her home or office.”90 If a person took precautions to

83

Madeline A. Herdrich, California v. Greenwood: The Thrashing Of Privacy, 38 Am. U. L. Rev. 993,
1001 (1989).
84
Id at 1001.
85
433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476 (1977). The FBI agents opened the footlocker of the respondents without the
respondents' consent or a search warrant and found large amounts of marijuana in it. The Supreme Court of
the United States affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals stating that the search was conducted more
than an hour after federal agents had gained exclusive control of the footlocker and long after respondents
were securely in custody; therefore the search could not be viewed as incidental to the arrest or as justified
by any other exigency. The Respondents were entitled to the protection of the Warrant Clause and their
privacy interests in the contents of the footlocker were not eliminated simply because they were under
arrest.
86
Herdrich, supra note 83 at 1002.
87
Id.
88
Freund, supra note 44 at 201.
89
662 F.Supp.1218,1218 (D.Conn. 1987).
90
Id at 1237.
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exclude others, this would heighten any legitimate expectation of privacy. 91 However a
question will arise, when a person is trying to prevent one type of intrusion, whether the
person is trying to prevent all types of intrusions. 92 This kind of determination is a
question of fact for the courts. 93 A Person’s actions can be used to overcome a claim that
a subjective expectation of privacy existed. 94 Therefore searches conducted with the
consent of the individual are exempt from the requirements of the Fourth Amendment. 95
Implied consent can be reasonably used but then strict standards would apply. 96 Hence, a
person calling for help would not diminish his or her expectation of privacy, but
voluntary abandonment of property would destroy any expectation of privacy. 97 If a
person wants to retain his privacy interest there has to be no abandonment. 98 A person
also looses his privacy when he shares information or shares the same areas with another
person. 99 But as seen in the Katz decision, 100 a person will have a reasonable expectation
of privacy even in areas open to the public as long as it is his intention to keep his privacy
in public. 101 At the same time a person cannot maintain an expectation of privacy in an
area, which is shared by others. 102 Providing property to an unknown person can
completely destroy a person’s subjective expectation of privacy. 103

91

Freund, supra note 44 at 202.
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id.
100
supra footnote 71.
101
Id.
102
United States v. Anderson 8598 F.2d 1171, 1177 (1988) (the trunk of the car which is shared by
another).
103
Rawlings v. Kentucky 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980).
92
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Unlike the subjective expectation of privacy, all objective expectations of privacy
are a matter of law rather than fact. 104 The legitimacy of a person’s claim to privacy is
determined “in light of all the surrounding circumstances,”105 or as the court in United
States v. Baron-Mantilla phrased it, by “the totality of the circumstances.”106 Hence, a
determination whether a search is reasonable requires an examination of the incident and
the final determination of reasonableness requires balancing, on one hand, an individual’s
legitimate expectation of privacy, and on the other hand, the government’s need for
effective law enforcement. 107 In addressing this objective prong, in Smith v. Maryland,108
the court considered whether the government's use of a telephone company’s pen register
to record telephone numbers from a suspect’s home was an intrusion of his privacy. 109
The telephone company, at police request, installed a pen register at its central offices to
record the numbers dialed from the telephone at petitioner's home. 110 The petitioner
moved to suppress all information derived from the pen register. 111 The Maryland trial
court denied this motion, holding that the warrantless installation of the pen register did
not violate the Fourth Amendment. 112 The petitioner was convicted, and the Maryland

104

Freund, supra note 44 at 203.
Rakas v. Illinois, 43 U.S. 128, 152 (1978). In this case the petitioners were in a suspected getaway car,
which was stopped by the police. Upon searching the car, the police found a box of rifle shells in the glove
compartment and a sawed off rifle under the front passenger seat. The petitioners were arrested. Before
trial, the petitioners moved to suppress the rifle and the shells on fourth amendments grounds, but the trial
court denied the motion on the ground that the petitioners lacked standing to object to the lawfulness of the
search of the car because they concededly did not own either the car or the rifle and shells. The Illinois
Appellate Court and the US Supreme Court affirmed. Justice Rehnquist of Supreme Court, held that
‘petitioners, who asserted neither a property nor a possessory interest in the automobile searched nor an
interest in the property seized, and who failed to show that they had any legitimate expectation of privacy
in the glove compart ment or area under the seat of the vehicle in which they were merely passengers, were
not entitled to challenge the search of those areas.’
106
743 F.2d 868,870 (1984).
107
Freund, supra note 44 at 204.
108
442 U.S. 735 (1979).
109
Herdrich, supra note 83 at 1004.
110
supra note 108 at 735.
111
Id.
112
Id.
105
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Court of Appeals affirmed. 113 In the case of California v. Ciraolo, 114 officers of the Santa
Clara police who were trained in marijuana identification secured a private airplane, flew
over respondent's house at an altitude of 1,000 feet, and readily identified marijuana
plants growing in the yard. 115 A search warrant was later obtained on the basis of a
photograph taken from the plane of the surrounding area, the warrant was executed and
the marijuana plants were seized. 116 The California trial court denied respondent's motion
to suppress the evidence of the search, and the California Court of Appeal reversed on the
ground that the warrantless aerial observation of respondent's yard violated the Fourth
Amendment. 117 But the Supreme Court reversed the order of the Court of Appeals and
held that the warrantless aerial observation of a fenced- in backyard within the curtilage of
a home was not unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 118

C. Concept of Seizure
A person is said to have been "seized" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment anytime when an officer conveys to that individual that he is no longer free
"to walk away" or " to ignore the police presence and go about his business."119 A person
does not have to be handcuffed and taken to the police station in order to have been
seized. 120 The police authority can affect a seizure by applying physical force or by a
show of authority. 121 In Michigan v. Chesternut, the defendant argued that he was
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unlawfully seized during police pursuit. 122 Four police officers riding in a marked police
cruiser were engaged in routine patrol duties in metropolitan Detroit. 123 The defendant
was standing on the curb. 124 The defendant noticed the police car and started running
away. 125 The officers followed the defendant in the patrol car, caught up with him and
drove alongside him for a short distance. 126 As they drove beside him, the officers
observed respondent discard a number of packets he pulled from his right-hand pocket. 127
An officer got out of the cruiser to examine the packets. 128 He discovered that they
contained pills. 129 When the officer was engaged in the inspection, the respondent who
was running a few paces ahead stopped. 130 Surmising on the basis of his experience as a
paramedic that the pills contained cocaine, the officer arrested the respondent for the
possession of narcotics and took him to the station house. 131 During an ensuing search,
the police discovered in the respondent's hatband another packet of pills, a packet
containing heroin, and a hypodermic needle. 132 The Respondent was charged with
knowingly and intentionally possessing heroin, tablets containing codeine, and tablets
containing diazepam, in violation of Mich.Comp.Laws § 333.7403(2) (1980). 133 Justice
Blackmun of the Supreme Court held that “no seizure of defendant occurred when police
officers in an automobile observed, the defendant upon seeing the automobile, started to
run, and officers accele rated to catch up to defendant and then drove alongside him
122
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before he discarded a pack of pills, which the officers then seized.”134 The Court
disagreed with the defendant finding that no Fourth Amendment "seizure" occurred by
the officers' conduct preceding the physical custody because a reasonable person would
not have felt compelled to stop. 135
In the case of California v. Hodari, 136 the defendant fled at the approach of an
unmarked police car. 137 The police gave chase and when the policeman was about to
tackle the defendant, the defendant tossed away a small rock of crack cocaine. 138 The
main issue in this case was whether, the defendant was seized within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment. 139 The exact moment of the seizure had to be determined. 140 If the
seizure occurred when the defendant was tackled, the abandoned drugs would be
admissible. 141 If the seizure occurred by the show of authority in chasing the suspect
while wearing police jackets, then the evidence would be inadmissible. 142 In order for
"seizure" to have occurred, there must either be some application of physical force, even
if extremely slight, or a show of authority to which the subject yields; a show of
authority, without any application of physical force, to which the subject does not yield is
not a seizure. 143 In this case, there was no application of physical force by the police. 144
The defendant did not stop at the show of authority constituted by the chase of the police
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and was therefore not “seized” when tackled. 145 The Court held that the cocaine
abandoned while the defendant was running was not the fruit of a seizure. 146
In situations involving a police chase, a two part inquiry must be satisfied: (1)
Was there a display of authority, or application of physical force, sufficient to convey to a
reasonable person that he is no longer free to leave, and (2) Did the show of authority
and/or application of physical force actually produce a stop? 147 The protections of the
Fourth Amendment apply when both questions are confirmed in the affirmative. 148

D. Concept of a Search
The concept of a search is also grounded in the determination of " reasonable
expectation of privacy."149 However, unlike the "seizure" cases, discussions of reasonable
expectations of privacy are most often found in cases dealing with searches. 150 Search
activity carries a lot more potentiality for the invasion of a person’s privacy expectations
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than does a seizure. 151 An individual whose reasonable expectation of privacy has not
been violated has not, by definition, been subjected to a Fourth Amend ment “search” or
“seizure”. 152 Therefore in order to determine whether a Fourth Amendment “search” has
occurred, the Court must determine whether the accused’s reasonable expectation of
privacy has been violated. 153 As a general rule, “looking at what is already exposed to
view” is not considered a “search”. 154 Asking the question whether the item was in the
plain view when observed leads to the question whether the Fourth Amendment applies
to all. 155 In the case of Florida v. Riley 156 the Florida Supreme Court stated that “[T]he
police may see what may be seen from a public vantage point where (they have) a right to
be. Once the police are lawfully in a position to observe an item firsthand, the owner’s
privacy interest in that item is lost. The owner can retain the title and possession of that
item but not its privacy.”157 The issue would, however, become more complex if the
police observation goes to such an extreme that it would be questionable as to whether it
is reasonable to assume that any member of the public wo uld ever make an observation
despite the fact that the public could legally make the same. 158

151

Id. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796,806 (1984); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13-14
(1977). The greatest potential for violating a privacy expectation exists in bodily intrusions.
152
Id. However, an infringement of a reasonable expectation of privacy means only the Fourth Amendment
has come into the picture. It is not a determination that the Fourth Amendment has been violated. In order
to make that determination, the Court must determine whether the search or seizure was “reasonable” under
the Fourth Amendments standards. See Jones, s upra note 49 FN 102.
153
Id.
154
Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 328 (1987). This rule is based upon the ‘plain view doctrine’. The
meaning of both the phrases is the same, but the doctrine of ‘plain view’ is technically different from the
reasonable expectation privacy analysis. Also see Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 738 (1983). The plain
view doctrine is an exception to the warrant requirement. It allows the police to seize any item without a
warrant if the police officer can see the object in plain view from a position, which he can legally occupy,
and the evidentiary value of the item in proving a crime is immediately present.
155
Jones, supra note 49 at 936.
156
488 U.S. 445, 449 (1989).
157
Id.
158
Jones, supra note 49 at 937.

19

In the case of California v. Ciraolo 159 , for example the Court held that the police
officers' warrantless aerial observation, from an altitude of 1,000 feet, during which the
plants were readily visible to the naked eye, did not violate homeowner's Fourth
Amendment rights. 160 Since airplanes routinely fly at such high altitudes in general, any
member of the public flying at that altitude could have observed the defendant’s
backyard. 161 But in this case the question would arise whether the public would ever
make such an observation of the defendant’s backyard.
The police have a right to be in any place where the public may go. 162 In the case
of Florida v. Riley, 163 the Court made the observation that “if a police officer can observe
anything in a person’s home while in a position where any member of the public can
make the same observation, then the object which is seen by the officer is said to be
clearly visible or has been knowingly exposed to the public.”164 In this case the defendant
did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial surveillance. “[A]ny
member of the pubic could have legally been flying over Riley’s property in a helicopter
at an altitude of 400 feet and could have observed Riley’s greenhouse. The police officer
did no more….[W]e would have a different case if flying at that altitude had been
contrary to law or regulation.”165
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While a person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy from another’s
view if the object is exposed to the public, the opposite is also true: one does have a
reasonable expectation of privacy if the item or area is not exposed to another’s view. 166
Consequently, if an object has to be moved in order to view evidence, the evidence is not
exposed and there is a reasonable expectation of privacy. 167 In the case of Arizona v.
Hicks,168 the police officers had entered the respondent’s apartment to find the person
who fired a bullet through the floor of the apartment. 169 The respondent had fired a bullet
through the floor, which had injured a man on the floor below. 170 While the policemen
were in the apartment they noticed two sets of expensive stereo components and,
suspecting that they were stolen, read and recorded their serial numbers. 171 They moved
some of the equipment, including a turntable, to do so and phoned in the numbers to
headquarters. 172 Upon learning that the turntable had been taken in an armed robbery, the
officer seized it immediately. 173 The Supreme Court had to determine whether the act of
moving the property to view the serial number was a “search” activity within the Fourth
Amendment. 174 The court held that a reasonable expectation of privacy had been
infringed by a “search”. 175 By touching the property and moving it, the police officer
“exposed to view concealed portions of the apartment and its contents.”176 As such, the
court did not take into consideration that the officer was only looking for a non-private
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy. The Court held that that the officer's actions constituted a
warrantless search, which violated the personal and societal values, protected by the Fourth Amendment.
166
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serial number on the property and nothing else was revealed by his actions. 177 What
mattered to the court was that the officer’s act exposed an area to the officer’s senses that
would otherwise have not been exposed. 178 The Court stated: “It matters not that the
search uncovered nothing of any great personal value….A search is a search, even if it
happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable.”179
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CHAPTER 3
ADVANCEMENT IN THE FIELD OF POLICE TECHNOLOGY
One hundred years ago, Brandeis and Warren had the foresight to state:
“The intensity and complexity of life…have rendered necessary some retreat from the
world, and man…has become more sensitive…so that solitude and privacy, subjected
him to mental pain and distress, far greater than could be inflicted by mere bodily
injury.”180 Since that time, the advancement in the field of technology and the increasing
complexities of society have posed serious questions about rightful intrusions of the
government on the privacy of citizens. 181
Information technology, communications and computer technology are
characterized by dramatic innovations. 182 Automated teller machines, computerized
reservation systems, full text databases and a myriad of other developments represent
great advances in convenience and human capabilities. 183 With the recent developments
in police surveillance technology there is a clash between an individual’s right to keep a
secret and the state’s power to penetrate that secret. 184 Modern technology has advanced
to such an extent that the cases dealing with the impact of this technology have become
very diverse and complex. 185 The court has been faced with the issues of arising out of
the use of, among other things, aircraft, medical technologies, electronic listening devices
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and devices which provide for visual enhancement. 186 Generally technology provides
police with a vantage point that most individuals cannot share. 187 Since police
observation often depends on the use of expensive and sophisticated machinery, the
ability to intrude is often unexpected. 188
Advances in the field of information technology are rendering obsolete traditional
processes and frameworks for the regulation of law enforcement surveillance methods. 189
As of today, surveillance is no longer limited by darkness, whispers or distance. 190 As
criminals have grown more sophisticated, criminal investigators have resorted to state-ofthe-art technologies in order to curb criminal activity. 191
Below is a description of some of the latest police technologies, which have given
rise to some serious privacy concerns.

A. The Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
First conceived in 1981, the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN)
got official life in 1990. 192 The mission of FinCEN is to support law enforcement
investigative efforts and promote interagency and global cooperation against domestic
and international financial crimes and to provide the United States policy makers with
strategic analyses of domestic and worldwide trends and patterns. 193 FinCEN works
toward those ends through information collection, analysis and sharing, as well as
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technological assistance and innovative, cost-effective implementation of the Bank
Secrecy Act and other Treasury authorities. 194
FinCen’s main mission is (1) to gather financial and related records and data from
federal, state, local and foreign agencies (2) to analyze collected records for evidence of
money laundering and other financial crimes and (3) to disseminate its findings to law
enforcement agencies in the United States and abroad. 195 FinCen is a unique kind of
enforcement tool. 196 It is a hybrid between a database and a focused surveillance tool and
combines qualities of many surveillance technologies. 197 It embodies the qualities of a
tracking device, pen register, a bloodhound, a hidden camera, wiretap, a high powered
telescope or even a parabolic microphone. It can be used to observe individuals without
even alerting them of its presence of surveillance. 198 FinCEN is not like any common law
enforcement technology; it has a certain measure of intelligence. 199 The FinCEN’s
database is linked via computer networks to computers at other agencies, which comb
through a vast amount of data routinely by way of vigilant software. 200 It is like a human
detective; the case based expert system conducts a focused inquiry, seeking leads,
hunting traces of illicit behavior, combining related pieces of information, and attempting
to connect individual suspects to a pattern of suspected criminal activity. 201
Why would FinCEN cause a threat to privacy? When records of our everyday
transactions are stored in massive databases and periodically searched for unspecified
194
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patterns thought to signal illicit activity, individuals are constrained in their thoughts,
choices and acts. 202 We should have the right to enlarge our conception of the personal
domain to not only include our body, but also a certain amount of breathing space around
our body. 203 Every individual has the right to make his own choices and decisions and
decide what personal information to disclose to others and what to conceal. FinCEN
threatens privacy by revealing a broad range of personal information never disclosed in
any meaningful sense by its subjects. 204 Continuous data base surveillance by an expertsystem computer network has a chilling effect on legitimate activity. 205 By contracting
the sphere of autonomy, it threatens to “deprive us of that liberty on which our humanity
fundamentally rests.”206

B. Global Positioning System.
To know one’s location and how to navigate to particular places are concerns that
have affected generations for years. 207 Since the 1950s, a number of positioning
technologies have been developed. 208 These include two very popular marine navigation
systems based on transmission of radio signals: OMEGA and Loran-C.209 The primary
disadvantages of these systems were lack of precision, global coverage, and inaccuracy in
areas of rugged terrain. 210 During the 1980’s, the first Global Positioning System (GPS)
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signals became available for use by non- military researchers. 211 The cost of equipment
was very high and it was assumed that civilian uses requiring high precision would be
limited to geodesy and civil engineering. 212 As low- grade field units for the military
became physically smaller and less expensive, the manufacturers of receivers began to
look at other potential markets. 213 At the same time, the rapidly expanding geographic
information systems (GIS) profession developed needs for inexpensive and rapid
methods of capturing high quality spatial information. 214 With the full development of the
GPS constellation of satellites in 1993, a new tool for general use arrived. 215 GPS
receivers are now another $200 electric commodity, which is often found in the sporting
goods section of a local department store. 216 GPS is based on satellite ranging. 217 If a
person knows the location of the satellite, he will be able to derive another location by
using basic trigonometry. 218 In order to determine a person’s position accurately, one
must know the exact location of several satellites. 219 A receiver needs four satellites to
pinpoint any spot on the globe, one for each of the variables, i.e., longitude, latitude,
elevation and time. 220 GPS is a huge success as the satellite clocks are so accurate that a
location can be determined within centimeters. 221 The Global Positioning System allows
a person (as well as others) to know where they are at all times. 222 If you go to an
unfamiliar city and rent a car which has a Global Positioning System (GPS) installed in it,
211
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you can program your destination into the dashboard- mounted computer and listen to the
computer generated voice which will help you make all the proper turns to get to your
destination. 223 What happens is that there are a series of satellites that send signals to help
the onboard computer determine the position of the car, and the computer coordinates the
signals with a mapping program, which gives the accur ate driving instructions. 224 This is
a unique form of an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS), which serves as a personal
navigation assistance device. 225 Along with route guidance, GPS is also able to provide
real-time information about traffic congestion and adverse weather conditions between a
driver’s current location and his destination. 226 GPS, in conjunction with the internet, can
guide people to their destination, find lost people, send emergency aid to those in trouble
and track a person’s whereabouts instantaneously. 227 It was used by the U.S. military
after the war in Vietnam and was designed to track the exact location of U.S. military
troops in the fields. 228
But this unique Intelligent Transportation tool poses a strong privacy risk. If you
scroll down the menu for the GPS unit, there is a function that shows past history. 229 For
example, you can see how fast the previous renter of the car traveled, 230 or the driving
record of the renter could be revealed. The Illinois Tollway Authority is conducting a
feasibility study to use GPS technology to replace motorists tossing coins into the toll
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baskets. 231 Instead, motorists using the Illinois tollways would be billed for actual miles
driven based on information in onboard computers logging the roadway use through
GPS.232 If this system becomes a reality the state tollway authority will be able to collect
vast amounts of information and the question is: How will they use it? 233 Personal data
could be given or sold to third parties, which could adversely affect the renter, or it could
be given to law enforcement officials. 234 Returning to the car rental example, would there
be any potential privacy rights violations by the installation of GPS? 235 Assuming that the
GPS requires activation by the renter, there may not be any personal rights violated; it
would be a voluntary decision whether to activate the system or not. 236 But the user may
not be aware that the system maintains information long after its use. 237 GPS is such a
sophisticated tool that it may become a substitute for an individual itself. 238 The GPS
generated travel profiles will threaten privacy, as this type of profiling will be
dehumanizing to the individual. 239 If the profile is different from the individual’s own
image, the separation can be psychologically damaging. 240 An individual will loose his
self-respect, as the tendency of GPS is to reduce the complexity of an individual’s human
personality to ciphers and formulas. 241 It makes no difference that the information
gathered is not personal or private, when compared, for example, with data about a
person’s health or financial status. 242 Individuals will be concerned when a
231

Id.
Id.
233
Id.
234
Id at 31.
235
Id at 30.
236
Id.
237
Id.
238
Glancy, supra note 224 at 165.
239
Id.
240
Id.
241
Id.
242
Id.
232

29

comprehensive information profile is constructed about any aspect of their life. 243 Also,
in a way, the transportation information collected will be likely to reveal some aspects of
a person’s private life. It might reveal, for example, where the person shops, works,
worships, reads, views movies or buys books. 244

C. Mobile Telecommunications.
The greatest feature of wireless communications is the ability to send and receive
messages from anywhere. 245 Many people can be tracked today without the use of
cameras or other devices. 246 In order to carry or receive calls, cellular phones must
communicate their location to a base station. 247 Therefore, whenever a cell phone is in
use, or set to receive calls, it effectively identifies the location of its user every few
minutes (within an area defined by the tolerance of the phone). 248 There are numerous
consumer benefits from technologies that track the location of mobile phone users. For
example, consider the following situation: Suppose an individual’s purse has just been
stolen. 249 His partner’s one-button mobile call to an emergency service immediately
pinpoints the individual’s location for the police, and the mobile phone inside the purse
allows the police to quickly track down the culprit. 250 Your always-on mobile phone
produces a signal that allows the police to follow your every movement with pinpoint
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precision. 251 In January 1997, Karen Nelson got lost while driving through a blizzard on a
remote stretch of South Dakota highway and drove her truck off the road into a snow
bank. 252 Nelson had a cellular phone with her and was able to call 911 for help, but she
did not know her location. 253 Since the emergency workers had no way of accurately
determining her location, it took almost 40 hours and a massive rescue operation
involving snow mobiles and airplanes before searchers finally located Nelson’s truck. 254
In order to provide the same level of 911 service to cellular telephone users as is currently
available to regular telephone users, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
requires cellular telephone companies to have the capability of determining the location
from which a cellular phone call originates to within 125 meters. 255 If Karen Nelson’s
accident had happened today, the South Dakota 911 operators could reduce the time
taken it took to rescue Karen from hours to minutes. 256
The enhanced 911, or E911 service has several stages. 257 At the most basic level, the FCC
requires emergency calls to be routed to a central processing center and to be transmitted
without regard to validation of the caller’s status as a subscriber. 258 At the more advanced
level, the FCC requires the carriers to provide location information of all wireless 911
callers to these processing centers. 259 The Phase I of the FCC rules require carriers to
provide information on the base station handling the call, which may narrow down the
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location of the caller to a few city blocks in a dense area or a few miles in the case of a
rural analogue cellular system. 260 The phase II rules, requires carriers to provide location
information with much greater precision. 261 According to the FCC timetable, U.S.
wireless carriers will have significant mobile location capabilities by 2005. 262
The cellular telephone call location technology now mandated by the FCC will
turn each of the more than fifty million cell phones in the United States into a tracking
device. 263 This poses a major privacy hazard. The very thought that your cell phone is a
giveaway of your location is frightening. Consumers clearly will be concerned about
securing their privacy against revealing location information without their consent. 264 In
the United States, in response to concerns expressed by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation that new telecommunications technologies could hinder criminal
investigations, Congress passed the Communications Assistance For Law Enforcement
Act (CALEA). 265 During the brief congressional debate leading up to CALEA’s passage,
then FBI director Louis Freeh stated that the FBI did not wish to turn wireless phones
into location-tracking devices. He stated: “There is no intention whatsoever to acquire
anything that could properly be called ‘tracking information’.”266 However, United States
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Federal Communications Comm’n,267 in implementing
CALEA, the FCC agreed to permit law enforcement agencies such as the FBI to have
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access to caller’s locations at the beginning and end of each call. 268 The District of
Columbia Circuit responded by holding that law enforcement would need more than a
mere pen-register--an order that can be obtained without a search warrant. 269 Mobile
location technologies promise a dramatic improvement in the safety and convenience
available to subscribers to wireless telecommunications services. 270 But at the same time
consumers will be apprehensive to subscribe to these services without adequate
assurances for their privacy. 271 All over the world the burden of demonstrating adequate
assurances for privacy is likely to fall upon mobile telecommunications carriers who wish
to offer their services to their subscribers. 272

D. Wearable Computing and Surveillance Cameras.
“ I AM A CAMERA”. 273 Wearable Computing promises to become the fourth
wave of computing following the developments of the mainframe, minicomputers and
personal computers. 274 A wearable computer is a computing device that is worn on the
body consisting of some type of output display, such as a small, eyeglass-size monitor,
and some input device, such as a one- handed keyboard or speech recognition system. 275
At the McLuhan Symposium on Culture and Technology, 276 Professor Steve Mann277
stated:
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“Just as the wheel is an extension of the leg, and radio is an extension of the voice, so too,
is the camera an extension of the eye, the computer [is] an extension of the brain, and
wiring, circuits, and the internet an extension of the nervous system.”
A wearable computer has the following characteristics:
(1) It is portable when operational - The most distinguishing feature of a wearable is that
it can be used while walking or otherwise moving around. 278 This is a distinguishing
feature between wearables and desktop and laptop computers . 279
(2) Hands free use - Military and industrial applications for wearables especially
emphasize their hands- free aspect, and concentrate on speech input and heads- up display
or voice output. 280 Other wearables might also use chording-keyboards, dials, and
joysticks to minimize the tying up of a user's hands. 281
(3) Sensors – The wearable computer incorporates sensors such as wireless
communications, GPS, cameras, or microphones. 282
(4) Always on and always running - By default a wearable is always on and working,
sensing, and acting. 283 It is also ‘Proactive’ i.e. it is able to convey information to its user
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even when not actively being used. 284 For example, if your computer wants to let you
know that you have new email and whom the email is from, it will be able to
communicate this information to you immediately. 285
Video surveillance and wearable computing share a critical component part i.e.
the video camera, which is a powerful technology tool that can significantly invade
privacy. 286 Video technology has changed the way people view the world around them
and the way people are viewed. 287 Over the years the camcorder has had numerous
advantages; there have been well-publicized and famous examples of surreptitious
filming serving the public good. 288 The most celebrated was George Holliday's videotape
of Los Angeles police officers beating Rodney King. 289 Other well-publicized examples
include an environmentalist who filmed fishermen slaughtering dolphins caught in tuna
nets, a suspicious parent who taped his baby sitter abusing his child, and a gay man in
California who, fed up with abusive taunting from his neighbor, set up a camcorder and
filmed the neighbor assaulting him in his front yard. 290 However these instances of
positive, surreptitious videotaping are overshadowed by many more situations when
video cameras have intruded unreasonably upon and individual’s privacy. 291 Voyeurs
have frequently used the video camera to surreptitiously record people in private
settings. 292 In the United States, over sixty urban centers use video surveillance in public
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places for law enforcement purposes. 293 Television broadcasting corporations and
viewers in the United States seem addicted to the vicarious thrill of watching invasions of
others’ privacy. 294 The number of surveillance cameras of all types in America is
overwhelming and growing every day. 295 Recently, the New York Civil Liberties Union
sent a survey team into Manhattan to count surveillance cameras. 296 The team counted
more than 2,400 cameras monitoring the movements of pedestrians, drivers, shoppers,
and anyone else who wandered into their range. 297 Great Britain is the world’s pioneer of
closed circuit television surveillance and over one million cameras are in place. 298 Three
hundred different cameras on thirty different networks monitor an average person in
London during the course of a single day. 299
The ubiquitous use of the video camera, both through public and private
surveillance, and the pervasive use of video camcorders have raised privacy concerns,
and similarly, the use of wearable computers will also raise privacy issues. 300 The ability
of the wearable computer to constantly record audio and video from the user’s
environment is the source for these privacy concerns. 301 In addition to the privacy
concerns raised by pervasive monitoring in video surveillance and wearable computing,
tracking abilities associated with video surve illance and wearable computers also threaten
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an individual’s privacy. 302 An increasing number of police departments in American
cities have set up video surveillance cameras, which in addition to pervasive monitoring
also have the ability to track an individual’s movement as they walk on a public street. 303
Like video surveillance systems, wearable computers represent a new threat to privacy
rights because this powerful new technological tool can constantly record and store
everything about a user’s environment through sensors. 304 While wearable computers are
a relatively new technology, it will become a pervasive toll used by almost all computer
users in the near future. 305 Currently there are no statutes or decisions regulating a
wearable computer’s intrusion into personal privacy rights. 306 But eventually, the
wearable computer’s ability to record video and audio communications will encroach on
an individual’s privacy. 307

E. Facial Recognition System.
An individual’s face is an important part of who he is and how people identify
him. 308 It would be very hard to recognize an individual if all faces looked the same. 309
Except in the case of identical twins, the face is arguably a person's most unique physical
characteristic. 310 While humans have had the inherent ability to recognize and distinguish
different faces for millions of years, computers are just now catching up. 311
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A ticket to the January 2000 Super Bowl XXXV in Tampa Bay, Florida, didn't
just get the spectators a seat at the biggest professional football game of the year. 312
Those who attended the event were also part of the largest police lineup ever conducted,
although they may not have been aware of it at the time. 313 The Tampa Police department
was testing out a new technology, called ‘FaceIt’, that allows snapsho ts of faces from the
crowd to be compared to a database of criminal mug shots . 314 Facial recognition software
can be used to find criminals in a crowd, turning a mass of people into a big lineup. 315 If
you look in the mirror, you can see that your face has certain distinguishable
landmarks. 316 These are certain peaks and valleys that make up the different facial
features. 317 Visionics defines these landmarks as ‘nodal points’. 318 There are about 80
nodal points on a human face. 319 The software measures a few of the nodal points, to
name a few: The distance between the eyes, width of the nose, depth of the eye socket,
cheekbones, jaw line and chin. 320
Facial recognition systems would be very beneficial to law enforcement agencies,
in their efforts to catch law violators and terrorists. But several government agencies have
abandoned facial- recognition systems after finding they did not work as advertised. These
agencies include the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), which experimented
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with using the technology to identify people in cars at the Mexico-U.S. border. 321 Facerecognition software is useless in huge areas like the airports, as the technology simply
isn't reliable enough for such an important security application. 322
The Facial Recognition system threatens privacy in a number of ways. 323 One
threat is the fact that facial recognition, in combination with wider use of video
surveillance, would be likely to grow increasingly invasive over time. 324 This kind of
system can rarely be confined to its original purpose. 325 New ways of using it will suggest
themselves, the law enforcement authorities will find them to be an irresistible expansion
of their power, and an individuals privacy will be destroyed. 326 Ultimately, the threat is
that widespread surveillance will change the character, feel, and quality of a human
being’s life. 327
Another problem that can arise is that of abuse of the system. 328 The use of facial
recognition in public places -- for example: airports -- depends on widespread video
monitoring, which is an intrusive form of surveillance that can record in graphic detail
personal and private behavior. 329 Over the years there have been numerous cases where
video monitoring has been misused. 330 After all, a human being eventually operates the
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video camera. 331 In Great Britain, for example, which has experimented with the
widespread installation of closed circuit video cameras in public places, camera operators
have been found to focus disproportionately on people of color, and the mostly male
operators frequently focus specifically on women. 332 The question is “How necessary is
facial recognition system for the security and safety of individuals?”333 With the recent
terrorist attacks in the United States and around the world, the Government will always
be justified in installing the new and latest surveillance devices for the protection of its
citizens. But the law enforcing agencies should ask themselves two questions: First, how
effective is the face recognition technology? 334 If the answer is no, then any further
discussion is pointless. 335 If the answer is yes, then the second question is whether the
technology violates the appropriate balance between security and liberty. 336 In reality,
facial recognition fails on both counts: as it does not work reliably and it doesn’t
significantly protect an individual’s security. 337

F. Thermal Imaging.
Thermal imaging is one of the latest technological tools in the government’s
arsenal to identify and eliminate illegal indoor cultivation of marijuana. 338 The indoor
cultivation of marijuana has rendered the traditional methods of detecting it obsolete, thus
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giving rise to widespread indoor cultivation of marijuana. 339 Indoor cultivation is very
lucrative since as many as four crops can be harvested annually. 340 However the whole
process of cultivation generates thermal energy, which either escapes or is vented to the
outside. 341 Such thermal energy can be detected by a thermal energy detection instrument,
know as a ‘Forward Looking Infrared Radar’ (FLIR). 342 This instrument senses
differences in surface temperatures and can record its findings on videotape. 343 Using
FLIR generated visual images, law enforcement officials may assume that an individual
is cultivating marijuana plants indoors. 344 These inferences, when combined with other
evidence, may then lead the police to discover illegal gardening operations. 345 The
question is whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment that his home will not be subjected to search by Thermal Imaging.
The landmark case of Kyllo v. United States346 involved the use of thermal imaging. What
happened in this case was that the law authorities suspected Kyllo of growing marijuana
in his home triplex, the agents used a thermal imaging device to scan the triplex in order
to determine if the amount of heat emanating from it was consistent with the highintensity lamps typically used for indoor marijuana growth. 347 The scan showed that
Kyllo's garage roof and a side wall were relatively hot compared to the rest of his home
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and substantially warmer than the neighboring units. 348 Based in part on the thermal
imaging, a Federal Magistrate Judge issued a warrant to search Kyllo's home, where the
agents found marijuana growing. 349 After Kyllo was indicted on a federal drug charge, he
unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home and then entered a
conditional guilty plea. 350 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, upholding the thermal imaging on
the ground that Kyllo had shown no subjective expectation of privacy because he had
made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home. 351 Even if he had, ruled the
court, there was no objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the thermal
imager did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's life, only amorphous hot spots on
his home's exterior. 352
But eventually the Supreme Court held that:
“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to
explore details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable without
physical intrusion, the surveillance is a [F]ourth [A]mendment ‘search’, and is
presumptively unreasonable without a search warrant.”
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“It is only when an individual exposes what is personal to the public, that the personal
item loses its Fourth Amendment privacy protection.”354 In othe r words, the police are
free to observe what everyone else can observe. 355 But in the case of Kyllo, it was his
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intention to keep his activity away from the view of the public. 356 If the thermal imaging
technology is used in a way, that it reveals marijuana plant cultivation only and nothing
else, then, it may be appropriate to allow its use. The technology, however, can be
misused i.e.-- it may be used to check if a person is present in his home, how many
people are inside a house, and whether they are together or in separate rooms. This
should not be allowed. 357

G. Canivore and Echelon
The main reason for computer security is data privacy. 358 People protect their
systems so that unwanted people can't see data they're not authorized to see. 359 The
computer networks of the world are routinely used in the commission of serious criminal
activities, including espionage, fraud and terrorist attacks. 360 Modern day organized crime
and terrorists rely “upon telecommunications to plan and execute their criminal activities
on a daily basis.”361
Carnivore is a sealed box that the FBI installs at an Internet Service Provider (ISP). 362
The box filters packets, looking for emails of suspected criminals. 363 Once emails from
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suspects are found, they are saved for decryption and analysis. 364 The FBI claims that
Carnivore is only meant for tapping the emails of suspected criminals. 365 Also built into
Carnivore is a remote-access capability that allows FBI agents to check on the progress of
the Carnivore system. 366 Authorities have used Carnivore-type tools more than 25 times in
all types of criminal cases and in order to catch fugitives, drug dealers, extortionists and
suspected foreign intelligence agents. 367 Carnivore is now called ‘DCS-1000’. 368
Carnivore is a major privacy risk. Even though it can be made active only by a
court order and directed only towards a suspect’s email, there is no way for it to not
intercept email of innocent private citizens while it scans for evidence in a criminal
investigation. 369 Because Carnivore uses key words and phrases, it is likely to pick up
email to and from people who have nothing to do with a crime simply because their email
contains certain words. 370 A recent article on CBSNews.com showed that the Carnivore is
not a reliable way of catching criminals. 371 The article reported that the FBI had
destroyed evidence gathered in an investigation involving Osama Bin Laden’s Al Qaeda
terror network after the FBI’s Carnivore’s system mistakenly captured information to
which the agency was not entitled. 372 A March 2000 memo to agency headquarters in
Washington stated that the FBI software had not only picked up targeted emails “but also
picked up emails on non-covered targets.”373 “The FBI technical person was apparently
364
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so upset that he destroyed all the email take, including the take on the suspect,” according
to this memo. 374 This episode was made public through a Freedom of Information Act
request filed by the electronic Privacy Information Center, which is a Washington
advocacy group. 375 The material was not included in an original release but became
public after a federal judge ordered the bureau to give out more documents. 376 The issue
in this case was an investigation in Denver in which the FBI’s Bin Laden unit was using
the bureau’s Carnivore system to conduct electronic surveillance of a suspect under a
Foreign Intelligence Act warrant. 377 The suspect’s name and other information
identifying details were marked out of the letter. 378 The memo surfaced as the FBI was
addressing concerns that it mishandled aspects of terrorism investigation prior to the
September 11 attacks. 379 Those concerns also focused on a warning from the FBI’s
Phoenix office about Arab pilots training in the United States last July. 380 Privacy groups
and some members of Congress have complained that Carnivore has the potential to
collect more information than what is required. 381 “Here’s confirmation of the fact that
not only did it do that, but it resulted in a loss of legitimately acquired intelligence,” said
David Sobel, general counsel of the Electronic Privacy Information Center, the group that
sued to get the documents. 382
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ECHELON is a term associated with a global network of computers that
automatically search through millions of intercepted messages for pre-programmed
keywords or fax, telex and e- mail addresses. 383 Every word of every message in the
frequencies and channels selected at a station is automatically searched. 384 The processors
in the network are known as the ECHELON Dictionaries. 385 ECHELON connects all
these computers and allows the individual stations to function as distributed elements an
integrated system. 386
ECHELON is a code word for an automated global interception and relay system
operated by the intelligence agencies in five nations – the United States, the United
Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 387 The original ECHELON dates back to
1971.388 However, its capabilities and priorities have expanded greatly since its
formation. According to recent reports, it is capable of intercepting and processing many
types of transmissions throughout the globe. 389 In fact, it has been suggested that
ECHELON may intercept as many as three billion communications every day, including
phone calls, e-mail messages, Internet downloads, satellite transmissions, and so on. 390
How does ECHELON work? 391 Apparently it collects data in several ways. Reports
suggest it has massive ground based radio antennae to intercept satellite transmissions. 392
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In addition, some sites reputedly are tasked with tapping surface traffic. 393 These
antennae reportedly are in the United States, Italy, England, Turkey, New Zealand,
Canada, Australia, and several other places. 394 It is also believed that ECHELON uses
numerous satellites to catch "overflow" data from transmissions between cities. 395 These
satellites then beam the informa tion down to processing centers on the ground. 396 The
main centers are in the United States (near Denver), England (Menwith Hill), Australia,
and Germany. 397 It is also believed that ECHELON has even used special underwater
devices, which tap into cables that carry phone calls across the seas. 398 According to
published reports, American divers were able to install surveillance devices on to the
underwater cables. 399 One of these taps was discovered in 1982, but other devices
apparently continued to function undetected. 400
There is evidence to show that Echelon significantly invades privacy. Although
the evidence is circumstantial, there are alleged violations by the secret surveillance of
political organizations such as Amnesty International. 401 Many nations have laws, that
prevent invasions of privacy. 402 But it is rumored that ECHELON has engaged in a trick
in order to avoid these legal restrictions. For example, it is rumored that nations would
not use their own agents to spy on their own citizens, but assign the task to agents from
other countries. 403 ECHELON is the ultimate in spy software. 404
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CHAPTER 4
GLOBAL TRENDS IN PRIVACY PROTECTION.405
A. India.
The Indian Constitution recognizes an impressive array of Fundamental Rights,
covering a wide range of civil, political, cultural, economic and social rights. 406 But the
Constitution does not expressly recognize the right to privacy. 407 However Article 21 of
the Constitution states: “No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except
according to procedure established by law.”408
In 1964, the Supreme Court first recognized that there is a right of privacy
implicit in Art. 21. 409 There are also other Indian laws that guarantee the right to
privacy. 410 Unlawful attacks on the honor and reputation of a person can invite an action
of tort or criminal law. 411 There are no general data protection laws in India. 412
Wiretapping is regulated under the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885, and on December 20,
1996, the Supreme Court of India ruled that: “[w]iretapping is a serious invasion of a
persons privacy” and called for the government to update the century-old Indian
Telegraph Act’s clause on interception. 413 This suit was a public interest suit brought by
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the People’s Union for Civil Liberties. 414 The Court ruled that an order for wiretapping
could be issued only by the Federal Home Secretary - the most senior official in India's
equivalent to the US Department of Justice. 415 In "urgent" cases, this power can be
delegated to slightly lower- level officials. 416 The Court said: “Wiretaps can be used only
if no ‘other reasonable means’ are available.”417 However, in this case, the Supreme
Court did not rule on what exactly is in the public interest and what justifies
interception. 418 Wiretapping in India is used by the Intelligence Bureau (Central Bureau
of Investigation), 419 which claims to be the longest-existing intelligence service in the
world. 420
However even after the modification of the act, there have been instances of
illegal wiretapping by the Indian government. 421 According to prominent NonGovernmental Organizations (NGO’s) in India, the mail of many NGO’s in Delhi and
other strife torn areas in India continue to be subjected to interception and censorship. 422
There are very comprehensive plans being made for a massive "citizens database" to be
owned and operated by the state. 423 It is rumored that this exercise will climax in a
scheme called ‘NISHAN’ (National Identification System Home Affairs Network) or the
INDIA CARD, by which all citizens will have to carry identity cards containing all
relevant information (including legal records) about them, identifying photographs and
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bio metric date (data about their body measurements, hand prints etc.). 424 This kind of
card is unnecessary as in India there are already various forms of identification-- For
example, a driver’s license, a Ration card (this is issued by the government to buy
groceries at a subsidized rate), a PAN (Permanent Account number) number given to all
Indian citizens who pay taxes. The Union Minister of India, Mr. L.K. Advani is very keen
on the implementation of INDIA CARD basically to check the influx of illegal
immigrants. 425
India is heading in the same direction as the west as people do end up giving more
personal details than they would care to ordinarily when for credit cards and opening
bank accounts. 426 NISHAN will merely put it all together — apparently for use by the
State — but the prospect of this data falling into wrong hands will rightfully make
anybody suspicious of this scheme. 427 If NISHAN is implemented, it will offer detailed
information on every citizen and would mean that “Big Brother” has arrived in India. 428

B.

The United Kingdom.
During the last decade, law enforcement agencies in Great Britain have

increasingly relied on Close Circuit Television (CCTV) surveillance to enhance public
security. 429 According to some researchers, the camera surveillance systems in the UK
are discouraging and thus preventing crime. 430 Public video surveillance in the UK began
very unassumingly in 1986, on a single square mile industrial estate outside the English
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town of King's Lynn. 431 Three CCTV video surveillance cameras were used and their
impact was immediate. 432 In the years before the cameras were installed, there had been
58 crimes recorded on the estate and in the two years following the installation, there
were no crimes reported. 433 Subsequently, cities and towns across Great Britain began
using this crime prevention measure. 434 By 1994, over three hundred jurisdictions in the
country had installed some form of public video surveillance. 435 In 1995, the national
government made available up to $3.1 million in matching grants for cities and towns to
establish CCTV video surveillance programs. 436 There are currently nearly eight hundred
local public video surveillance programs in operation in the UK and the British
government provides $22 million annually in matching grants. 437
According to the English civil libertarians, there is no control in the UK over the
commercial use of public video images recorded by CCTV. 438 Because the United
Kingdom has more video surveillance per capita than any other country in the world, it is
very easy to find footage from parking garages, housing developments, department stores
and offices that may have commercial value. 439 Cameras may record women undressing
in department store changing rooms, or husband and wives engaging in domestic
squabbles. 440
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The United Kingdom does not have a Bill of Rights that protects individuals from
government intrusions on privacy. 441 Individuals have limited recourse against local
government agencies that provide revealing tapes to commercial producers. 442 While
invasion-of-privacy lawsuits can be filed against the producers, they often protect
themselves by making the footage sufficiently fuzzy to prevent clear identification of
individuals. 443
The UK is a member of the Council of Europe and has signed and ratified the
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of
Personal Data (ETS No. 108) along with the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 444 In addition to these commitments, the UK
is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and has
adopted the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data . 445

C. Australia.
Neither the Australian Federal Constitution nor the Constitution of the six States
contains any express provisions relating to privacy. 446 After the terrorist attacks on
America on September 11, 2001, the Australian Parliament passed the Cybercrime Bill
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2001 and a series of bills to expand electronic surveillance powers and increase penalties
for espionage . 4 4 7 The principal federal statute is the Privacy Act of 1988. 448
In December 2000, the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (the
Amendment Act) was passed by federal Parliament. 449 This amends the Privacy Act,
which, until now, has mainly covered public sector agencies. 450 The National Privacy
Principles (NPPs) in the Privacy Act set out how private sector organizations should
collect, use, keep secure and disclose personal information. 451 The principles give
individuals a right to know what information an organization holds about them and a
right to correct that information if it is wrong. 452

D. Germany.
The German government has approved a surveillance regulation that is intended
to make it easier for authorities to eavesdrop on communications via fixed- line and
mobile phone, e-mail, fax, and SMS (short message service). 453 This move put Berlin in
line with other Western governments rushing to enact similar rules since the September
11 terrorist attacks in the United States. 454 The new rule, passed by the Cabinet requires
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network providers to install and maintain equipment and procedures to give access to
their customers' electronic traffic when authorities have a legal surveillance order. 455
The technical requirements are limited to providers of “public telecommunication
systems,” which include fixed- line and mobile phone operators and providers of e-mail
accounts, but not ISPs (Internet service providers). 456 However, "operators of the means
of transmission that provide immediate user access to the Internet," such as DSL (digital
subscriber line) connections, are also required to install the eavesdropping technology. 457
In Germany, the largest such operator is ‘Deutsche Telekom AG’, which is the former
incumbent telecom provider, which is still majority-owned by the state. 458
The proposals for surveillance regulations were set by the Government officials
before September 11, but faced heavy criticism from the IT and telecom industry, which
complained of the high cost of installing the required equipment. 459 However, industry
representatives agreed to a compromise version of the regulations with the government
officials. 460
Not all industry concerns were addressed in the new version, said the IT industry
association BITKOM (Bundesverband Informationswirtschaft, Telekommunikation und
neue Medien e.V.) in a statement, "but the regulation now presents an acceptable
compromise between the legitimate interests of the state in surveillance of
telecommunication and the Internet, on one side, and the technical and economic
possibilities for the realization in practice on the other side."461 BITKOM was particularly
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relieved that the compromise version does away with plans for the who lesale surveillance
of service providers, and instead focuses on user network connections, which the group
said lightens the load for smaller network providers and ISPs. 462 But the privacy
advocates were not easily pacified. Twelve human rights groups warned of the danger of
a "surveillance state," citing the country's experiences with totalitarianism under the Nazi
regime and East German communism. 463
The privacy activists stated: "The balance between legally guaranteed citizen
freedoms and the state's rights of encroachment must not -- as at present -- be abolished
in the interest of abstract state security.”464 These activists include the Humanist Union,
the German Association for Data Protection, and the hackers' group Chaos Computer
Club. 465 They were addressing not only the eavesdropping rule, but also other proposed
security measures including fingerprinting, the release of student records to police, and
increased surveillance of foreigners. 466

E. China.
There are limited rights to privacy in the Chinese Constitution, which are subject
to broad exemptions for protecting state security. 467 China has a long-standing policy that
keeps a close track of its citizens. 468 According to expert W.J.F Jenner, “ The Chinese
States by the fourth century BC at latest were often remarkably successful in keeping
records of their whole populations so that they could be taxed and conscripted. The state
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had the surname, personal name, age and home place of every subject and was also able
to ensure that nobody could move far from home without proper authorization.”469
In September 2001, the Chinese police set up a computer system along the Chinese
railway network that allows officers to compare the faces of suspicious passers-by to an
electronic database of mugshots. 470 This was done ahead of a week- long holiday that
began in October during which an estimated 64 million people were expected to be
travelling across China. 471 Now when passengers come into and depart from Beijing
Station, they have to pass through numerous checkpoints. 472 Anyone who acts or looks
suspicious is taken to a computer terminal linked to a network of wanted law breakers. 473
At least four such terminals were installed in the plaza in front of Beijing Station. 474
Suspects are lined up and compared to photographs and other information on thousands
of wanted criminals from around China. 475
Since 1984, all Chinese citizens over the age of 16 have been required to carry
identification cards issued by the ministry of Public Security. 476 Identification cards
include name, sex, nationality, date of birth, address and term of validity, of which there
are three: between the ages of 16 and 25, it is 10 years, between the ages of 25-45, it is 20
years and for those aged 45 and over it is permanent. 477 In carrying out their duties,
public security organs have the right to ask citizens to show their identity cards. 478
469
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By mid-2003 all of Hong Kong's 6.8 million residents will be offered digital
identity cards for use in secure online transactions when the authorities introduce a new
“smart” nationa l identity card. 479 This card will replace the existing national identity
cards held by all Hong Kong residents for immigration and foreign travel purposes. 480
The new chip card is controversial because it will contain other applications in addition to
identity details, raising privacy concerns. 481 The card has embedded computer chips that
hold names, pictures and birth dates as well as a digital template of both thumbprints. 482

F. France.
While ECHELON has gained widespread notoriety, there is evidence that
European countries are also carrying out international surveillance. 483 France reportedly
has developed its own "Frenchelon" which is a worldwide network of spy satellites and
listening stations that systematically eavesdrop on communications in the United States
and elsewhere. 484 Monitoring stations are said to exist in French Guiana, in the city of
Domme in the Dordogne region of southwestern France, in New Caledonia, and in the
United Arab Emirates. 485
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The information collected is reportedly used for both political and commercial
ends. 486 Additionally, some people speculate that the French project may mark the first
step in a pan- European effort to counterbalance the U.S.'s global spying capabilities. 487
The French project is said to be run under the Direction Gené ralé de la Sécurité
Extérieure, an organization similar to the United States Central Intelligence Agency, and
commercial information it generates is sent directly to the presidents of large French
companies as well as government officials. 488 The existence of French global
surveillance, first publicized in June 1998 by Jean Guisnel of the French newsweekly Le
Point, has not been officially confirmed or denied by the French government. 489 The lack
of a denial has caused observers to speculate that such a program may exist. 490
Unlike the ECHELON project, which has been publicly documented by the U.K.
based human rights organization, Omega Foundation, in a report for the European
Parliament's Scientific and Technological Options Assessment (STOA) unit in January
1998, there is no official evidence that France or any other European nation practices
systematic surveillance of international civilian communications. 491
However, a French official familiar with the France's system stated privately that
such a program indeed exists, but at a "vastly smaller scale" than ECHELON. 492 The
person claimed that ECHELON intercepts around 3 million messages per minute, while
the French system intercepts roughly 2 million messages per month. 493
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CHAPTER 5
FUTURE PRIVACY ISSUES
Privacy is a very complex and vexing issue. 494 Solutions to the problem of privacy
would be very easy to imagine but difficult to implement. 495 As between many privacy
issues the privacy issue dealing with biometrics is especially alarming. 496 The biometric
industry is booming and soon there will be a widespread adoption of biometric
systems. 497 If for example, one form of biometric systems such as fingerprinting were
adopted, the various databases containing the digitized versions of the prints could be
combined. 498 While such a system is most likely to be developed by the commercial
sector for use in financial transactions, the government would be likely to want to take
advantage of these massive databases for other purposes, especially if a country were to
enter a time of social unrest and instability. 499 The widespread implementation of video
surveillance is harmful for several reasons. 500 We are growing more accustomed to video
cameras watching our every movement. 501 We will soon reach a time when these cameras
will be considered part of the furniture and will loose track of our civil and fundamental
rights. 502
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In the new world of electronic commerce, an emphasis is being placed on the
establishment of mechanisms for authenticating the identity of an individual who wishes
to enga ge in a transaction. 503 In order for electronic commerce to move beyond simple
online credit card purchases, and into more complex transactions involving contracts or
financing, some form of ‘digital signature’ mechanism is a certain development. 504 While
such a signature would make new commercial transactions possible, it also raises
significant privacy concerns, because if safeguards were not built into such a system, it
would create permanent electronic tracks. 505
The next emerging privacy issue would be the “smart card” proposals. 506 In
assuming consumers will continue to sacrifice privacy for convenience, the creation of a
single card or number, that combines commercial and government transactions requiring
authentication, is a likely possibility. 507 There is increasingly rapid growth in wireless
technologies. 508 Digital cell-phones are becoming smaller, cheaper and have more
sophisticated features. 509 They can send and receive email messages, surf the internet and
so on. The vision of many corporations and Internet start-ups is to be able to deliver
location specific advertising to these cell phone devices. 510 So, if you’re traveling through
the city on a freeway, you might receive a message telling you that just off the next exit is
a restaurant that serves your favorite food. 511 Or as you walk past Starbucks, you’ll be
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flashed a message offering you a special on double lattes. 512 Cell phones must now be
able to pinpoint the user’s location to the nearest 100 feet for emergency assistance
purposes. 513 If you are in a traffic accident, emergency vehicles can find you easily to
administer assistance. 514 Unfortunately the cost of these conveniences and personal safety
measures is personal privacy. 515 Our cell phones will continue to remain location-tracking
devices. 516
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CHAPTER 6
REMEDIES
The Privacy Act of 1974 517 attempted to strike a fragile balance between the
government's need to gather and to use personal information and the individual's
competing need to maintain control over such personal information. 518 In furtherance of
these competing goals, the Privacy Act requires every federal agency maintaining a
record on an individual within a system of records to: (1) permit the individual to control
the use and dissemination of information contained in the record; (2) permit the
individual to review, to correct, or to amend information contained in the record; (3)
regulate and restrict the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of information in
the record; and (4) be subject to civil suit for specified violations of the Priva cy Act. 519
Collectively, these safeguards are designed to protect individual privacy, while
preserving the government's ability to gather and to use personal information. 520
The Privacy Act of 1974 attempts to strike a balance between the government's need to
gather and to use personal information and the individual's need to exercise control over
that information. 521 The balance, however, has never been achieved. 522 Instead, the
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Privacy Act has favored the government's desire for information at the expense of
individual privacy. 523
The best way to protect privacy is to give individuals the tools to do it
themselves. 524 There should be a watch over the government's tendency to sacrifice
people's privacy for other goals and perform government wide reviews of new federal
programs for privacy violations before they're launched. 525 If the Government is
implementing certain surveillance technologies, there should be notification of such
surveillance to the citizens. 526
Laws are needed that require improved computer security. 527 In 1970 Congress
passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which gave Americans the previously denied right
to see their own credit reports and demand the removal of erroneous information. 528 Elliot
Richardson, who at the time was President Nixon's Secretary of Health, Education and
Welfare, created a commission in 1972 to study the impact of computers on privacy. 529
The most important contribution of the Richardson report was a bill of rights for the
computer age, which was called the ‘Code of Fair Information Practices’. 530 “The code is
based on five principles:
1. There must be no personal-data record-keeping system whose very existence is secret.
2. There must be a way for a person to find out what information about the person is in a
record and how it is used.
523
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3. There must be a way for a person to prevent information about the person that was
obtained for one purpose from being used or made available for other purposes without
the person's consent.
4. There must be a way for a person to correct or amend a record of identifiable
information about the person.
5. Any organization creating, maintaining, using or disseminating records of identifiable
personal data must assure the reliability of the data for their intended use and must take
precautions to prevent misuse of the data.
Privacy is one of our most cherished freedoms, and today it is being suppressed
by technology. The shape of our future will depend on how we deal with the present
issues. I think the main remedies for privacy violations would how we control or regulate
this threat to our freedom as we face it today.”531
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
It is true that with the advancement in technology our society has become very
interconnected and interdependent, making it difficult to have absolute privacy. But every
society should also have its limits. Police technology invading our privacy rights would
also have a detrimental effect on the mental health of a person. 532 It would increase the
amount of stress in our lives, and we would be less free to disclose personal information
in interpersonal relationships. 533 Computer profiling in the case of the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network 534 could raise equal protection issues. 535 FinCen searches use
variables such as race, religion, gender and national origin. 536 The system might identify
people as suspects on the basis of their names or surnames or national origin. 537
But a major issue, which would justify the government in resorting to these
measures, would be to combat the problem of terrorism. Terrorism had been employed
for centuries as a means of forcing change through heightened diplomatic pressure and
politically consequential violence without having to bear any responsibility. 538 Terrorism
creates fear and thus undermines the confidence of society. 539 Essentially terrorism has
three effects: An immediate effect of killing or injuring those who are deemed a
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prohibited target; an intermediate effect of intimidating the larger population therefore
influencing their political behavior; and an aggregate effect of undermining overall public
order. 540 With the recent terrorist attacks on the United States and around the world, the
government is justified in enforcing new measures in order to ensure our safety. In my
country, India, terrorism has been a problem for years and if I had a choice to chose
between my privacy on one hand and my safety on the other, without hesitation, I would
choose the latter. But at the same time there has to be a balance struck somewhere in the
middle. 541 We need to protect our privacy and also support law enforcement by utilizing
new technologies specifically designed to keep our countries safe from thieves, criminals
and terrorists. 542
Ever since I became interested in the issue of privacy, I always remember the
novel ‘1984’ written by George Orwell. 543 In his novel, Orwell envisioned that by the
year 1984, a totalitarian government would rule the world. In his novel, he described a
society where there were cameras in people’s homes and in their work places. The
surveillance was so powerful to the extent that the government controlled people’s
thoughts. People were constricted in their acts and could not lead a normal healthy life.
There was a famous caption that was used repeatedly throughout the novel: “BIG
BROTHER IS WATCHING YOU”. Big Brother signifies the government. The
totalitarian world envisioned by Orwell never became a reality, but in essence he is trying
to let people know that they should be aware of what is going on around them. We have
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certain fundamental rights, which are very precious to us, and I think these rights should
never be taken away.
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